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 Many historians have looked at the interim period of the Baltic States between World 
War I and World War II, and their independence movements.  However, there are few 
substantial works that look at the complex and interrelated histories of how Russian and 
American foreign policy shaped the Baltic independence movements and subsequently gained 
international recognition.  This paper will try to address how and why the Baltic States were 
able to gain and maintain their independence by external forces and then gain formal 
recognition by the United States in 1922.  To gain my results, I analyzed some of Lenin’s 
translated writings on foreign policy, many relevant telegrams and letters published in the 
National Archives of the U.S., and went through secondary sources from both American and 
Baltic historians.  I found that self-determination rhetoric, WWI, and the Russian Civil War were 
the primary forces that allowed Baltic nationalists to fill the power vacuums created by those 
same sources, and the stabilization period that followed made U.S. recognition a possibility. If 
we can understand how and why Baltic independence was secured during the 1920s, we can 
have a more thorough explanation of the role of the Baltic States in the collapse of the Soviet 







When writing a historical background section for a symposium volume titled, “The Baltic 
in International Relations between the Two World Wars” editors John Hiden and Aleksander 
Loit provided a relatively concise and informative summary of the history of the Baltic States.  
Concerning the 1920s, they wrote, “Internal instability caused by external intervention and civil 
war ensured that Soviet Russia’s effort to retain the Baltic republics was not successful.”1  That 
observation explains how the Baltic States were able to maintain their independence and did 
not rejoin Russia.  However, this statement needs to be expanded upon in order to holistically 
comprehend the turbulent history of why and how Russia’s Western Provinces became three 
independent Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with full U.S. de jure recognition.   
 External intervention and influence not only caused internal instability, but also 
paradoxically created the conditions necessary for internal stability in favor of Baltic 
independence. Self-determination rhetoric from Bolshevik Russian leaders and the U.S. fueled 
independence and recognition movements.  External intervention in the form of World War I’s 
eastern front, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and the Russian Civil War initially created chaotic and 
unstable political conditions.  Ultimately, those unstable internal conditions created the power 
vacuums for stable nationalist institutions and governments to take form.  Those same forces 
that allowed for Baltic nationalists to take power became roadblocks toward U.S. recognition.  
Formal recognition from the international community solidified the newfound internal stability 
in the Baltic States as U.S. foreign policy toward the region changed in 1922.  
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Since the beginning of the 19th century, the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania were a part of the Russian Empire.  Peter the Great’s 19th century imperial conquests 
of the territory gave Russia access to the Baltic Sea’s ports and new lands to add to the large 
empire.2  The cultural awakenings of the late 19th century occurred in the Baltics after a long 
period of Russification.  Popular Baltic folklore, literature, and art reappeared along the Sea in 
an attempt to revive the local culture.  The differences between each state and more 
importantly, between the Baltics and Russia, became clearer during this period.   
Self-determination became a powerful revolutionary current after the 1880s as local 
populations began to recognize the social and ethnic disparities in the region.3  In the Baltics, 
class had everything to do with ethnicity, and the indigenous populations had been at the 
bottom of the social ladder.  While the Bolsheviks wrote of the need for Russia’s multi-ethnic 
peoples to ignore calls for nationalism and instead focus on the oppression they face by the 
bourgeoisie, they were ignoring the intertwined nature of class and ethnicity.4  Most of the 
Baltic natives were still living in the agrarian countryside after the delayed renunciation of 
serfdom.   Increasingly, native Baltic peoples were starting to fill in the ranks of the new urban 
class, the petty bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia with the spread of industrialization.5  Yet the 
same generation that was experiencing mild social mobility was not so far removed from the 
old class system in which only the Russians and the Germans held the higher social positions.  
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The attack of the Bolsheviks on the new native middle class pushed them away from socialist 
ideology and towards the center nationalists.6  The growing class of native Baltic urban 
professionals would come to play a key role in championing the cause of their own national 
self-determination.7 The sudden growth of this new class allowed them to become more 
politicized so they could eventually have a say in forming their own state.  
The Russian Revolution of 1905 and then the Russian Revolutions of 1917 saw the rise of 
Baltic nationalism. The 1917 Russian Revolution changed Baltic calls for autonomy to ones of 
independence.  Declarations of independence based of self-determination principles brought 
Baltic nationalist politicians to power as new governments formed along the Baltic Sea.  As it 
dominated the conversation on questions of nationality, self-determination rhetoric fueled the 
fight for autonomy and independence.  In both the U.S. and Russia, the rights of self-
determination were professed and then echoed by different political factions in the Baltic 
States, most notably, the nationalists.  The consistent championing of the right to self-
determination by President Woodrow Wilson consequentially caused Baltic nationalists to turn 
to the U.S. for assistance and independence recognition. 
World War I brought with it unstable political conditions that resulted in the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk.  Its adoption had monumental effects for Baltic nationalists as it separated 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from Russia.  Germany’s attempt to create Baltic puppet states 
was however unsuccessful because the Allies overturned it 8 months later when Germany lost 
the war.  The end of WWI affected the Baltic independence movements from the Armistice to 
                                                          
6





the Versailles Peace Treaty with numerous political factions claiming power.  As German 
soldiers left the Baltics, nationalist governments were left vulnerable to Russian invasion 
without outside help.  Baltic pleas for U.S. recognition that would safeguard their institutions 
were ignored.  U.S. foreign policy toward Russia and the Baltics was also framed during this 
time period and stubbornly insisted on non-recognition.  The U.S. would not recognize Soviet 
Russia because of the Bolshevik presence, but its decision to not recognize nationalist Baltic 
governments that filled the power vacuum was rooted in its allegiance to White Russians 
claiming the old Empire’s territorial integrity be maintained.   
The Russian Civil War as it occurred in the Baltic States showed how both White Russian 
and American diplomats worked together to stall recognition.  The signing of peace treaties 
between the Russian Bolsheviks and the Baltic nationalists brought back internal stability.  This 
time, governments representative of the indigenous population were at the head of this 
stability.  Such a turn of events in each of the Baltic States allowed dedicated supporters of 
Baltic independence to finally gain de jure recognition by the United States.  The 1920 election 
that forced a change in administration, along with a stable period of nationalist rule in the 
Baltics allowed for the extension of full recognition.   
This paper will be organized into five chapters that look at the interplay of forces 
between Russia, the United States, and the Baltic States in terms of how they contributed to 
Baltic independence and U.S. recognition.  The first chapter will look at how self-determination 
rhetoric fueled nationalist movements around 1917 and shaped independence declarations.  
The chapter begins with an examination of the Bolshevik party’s definition of self-
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determination and then moves to how those principles spread to the Baltic Provinces through 
the Provisional Government and subsequent independence declarations after the 1917 October 
Russian Revolution.  It concludes with an attempted explanation as to why and how the Baltic 
States looked to the U.S. for support of their right to self-determination.  The second chapter 
tries to explain the importance of WWI as an external intervention on Baltic instability that 
created power vacuums. The effect of the October Russian Revolution and subsequent 
Bolshevik power struggles, particularly in Latvia, are also examined.  The chapter ends with a 
look at the ongoing negotiations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by the Bolshevik Russians and its 
result in the Baltic States.  The third chapter outlines how the external intervention that 
allowed Baltic nationalists to come to power was also the impetus for the U.S. non-recognition 
policy.  It begins with the arguments used by Russian governments to claim the Baltic Provinces 
as their own, looks at the connection between those arguments and the formation of U.S. 
policy toward the Baltics, mentions the arguments used against propping up Baltic buffer 
states, and ends with the importance of White Russian influence in America.  The fourth 
chapter examines the Russian Civil War as it occurred in the Baltic States.  A large portion of the 
chapter is dedicated to showing how the Armistice and Versailles Peace Treaty expanded the 
Civil War into the Baltics as instability grew with myriad armed groups vying for political 
influence.  The White Russian arguments used to defer U.S. recognition are expanded upon, 
paying special attention to the economic arguments stated by the Russian Ambassador to the 
U.S., Boris Bakhmetev.  U.S. policy is revisited in response to chaotic conditions in the Baltic 
States throughout 1920 and 1921.  This chapter also mentions White Russian losses as the Civil 
War continues due to the successful rejection of White Russian influence in the Baltics 
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culminating in Baltic-Soviet peace treaties.  The fifth chapter is dedicated to the last two years 
of the battle for de jure recognition from the U.S.  It starts out with failed attempts at de facto 
recognition, and moves to the 1920 election, after which unofficial Baltic representatives were 
allowed to stay in America and Consuls were set up in each Baltic State.  The roles of 
Commissioner Young in Riga, private U.S. firms, and American citizens and domestic 
representatives are highlighted.  Ambassador Bakhmetev’s resignation and recognition from 
the international community is summarized and then revisited with an exploration of the 
domestic pressure that influenced Hughes to extend full recognition.   
Throughout this paper I make mention of various political groups in the U.S. and the 
Baltic States.  This was done intentionally as a representation of the confusion and uncertainty 
Baltic nationalists faced when looking into the future of their states.  For convenience, I have 
limited the number of groups mentioned and used some names interchangeably, although that 
should not diminish their importance.  For example, different political institutions such as the 
Latvian National Council, the guberniya, and the National Council of Lithuania comprised of 
different democratically elected representatives of various political parties are later rebranded 
as just the “Baltic nationalists.”  Under different names, many political groups were seeking 
Estonian, Latvian, or Lithuanian independence and U.S. recognition but they all had the same 
overarching goals, so I used the general name of Baltic nationalists to include all of them.  It 
should be noted that the Lithuanian National Council also went by the name of the Taryba, 
even while under German influence.  Lastly, the different spelling of Estonia, either with or 
without the letter “h” was chosen based on the source.  Most U.S. State Department records 
use the “Esthonia” spelling while others do not.  The inconsistency is also present in this paper. 
9 
 
Chapter 1: The Power of Self-Determination 
To understand the attitudes of self-determination in the Baltics, Lenin’s position on the 
nationality question must be understood.  After some nationalist uprisings in the late 1800s and 
the intensity of the 1905 Russian Revolution in the Baltics, Bolshevik theorists had to address 
the nationality question.  Lenin started to address the issue in 1913.  He clearly stated his 
position in support of the rights of all peoples to separate from Russia.  One passage from his 
writings that shows this idea explicitly states, “as regards the national question, the proletarian 
party must, first of all, insist on the promulgation and immediate realization of full freedom of 
separation from Russia for all nations and peoples who were oppressed by Tsarism.”8  Bolshevik 
ideology was against nationalism, oppression, and annexations.  This meant that they would 
need to defend maintaining the Baltic Provinces in the Russian Empire while championing 
contradictory ideas.     
 Whilst supporting a large multi-ethnic communist state, Lenin was condemning large 
multi-ethnic empires; those ideas seem to contradict one another.  In Lenin’s October 25th, 
1917 “Decree on Peace” speech at the All Russian Congress of Soviets, he exclaimed, “if any 
nation is kept within the frontiers of another state by violence…to decide without the least 
compulsion the question of the form of its state existence, then holding on to such a nation is 
annexation, i.e., seizure and violence.”9 His ideological disagreement with the multi-ethnic 
empires of the time stemmed from the fact that those ethnic minority states were annexed.  
That was the fundamental difference between his idea of a large state and the multi-ethnic 
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empires already in existence.  Lenin defined annexation by including all of the subject peoples 
of Russia.10  I agree with Stanley Page’s perspective that Lenin’s attitude “created the 
impression that he stood for complete dissolution of the Russian Empire into its component 
feudal parts.”11  By defining annexations in such a manner, Lenin makes it seem as if he does 
not support keeping any annexed nation within the Empire and supports independence for all 
of those national minorities, such as the different ethnic groups living in the Baltics.12  
In the end, Lenin sought to reconcile nationalism and self-determination with 
international Marxism.  Lenin showed his optimism in the success of a large soviet state when 
he wrote:  “The proletarian party strives to create as large a state as possible, for this is in the 
interests of the workers; it strives to bring the nations closely together, to fuse them but it 
intends to bring that about not by the use of force, but only by a free brotherly union of the 
workers and the toiling masses of all the nations.”13  Lenin wanted to create such a communist 
state without force, and evidently believed that although nationality and self-determination 
were important, states would voluntarily give up some of their own sovereignty to join a free 
brotherly union of the workers under Petrograd’s central rule.  Lenin’s solution to the national 
question was to incorporate those ideas of international Marxism so that all nations would 
unite under centralized rule, and give up nationalistic ambitions.  
The ideological goals of self-determination gained explicit recognition and support at 
the meeting of the Council of People’s Commissars on November 15, 1917.  At this meeting, the 
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Council announced the self-determination of the nations of Russia.14  The meeting produced 
the “Declaration of the Rights of the People of Russia” signed “in the name of the Russian 
Republic, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, V. Ulianov.  People’s Commissar on 
Nationality Affairs, Josef Dzhugashvili.”15 The document began with mention of “emancipation” 
of workmen and peasants, and then led into the evils of the Tsarist regime for inciting the 
peoples of Russia against one another;  something Lenin thought his government would not 
have to do to maintain the large state because annexed lands would want to join the workers’ 
utopia Russia was supposed to become.  The language used to describe the people of Russia as 
just now “being emancipated from the hateful shackles” provides readers the sharp contrast 
between the prior regimes and the new Bolshevik rule as a government that is against 
imprisoning its people.16  The end of the declaration summed up the Council’s views on the 
question of Russia’s nationalities in four principles: all people of Russia are sovereign and equal, 
people of Russia have the right to free self-determination, “even to the point of separation and 
the formation of an independent state,” all national privileges are disabled, and national 
minorities and ethnographic groups can freely develop.17 Lenin simultaneously championed the 
right of all people to secede from Russia and denounced the century long practice of national 
privileges while calling for a strong centralized proletarian state. 
Bolshevik speeches and declarations had strong notions of self-determination that 
spread to the Baltics as did the Bolshevik influence in government even before the October 
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Russian Revolution.  The Latvian governing bodies in particular, were heavily influenced by 
Leninist ideas.  According to Andrew Ezergailis, “by July 1917 the Latvian Bolsheviks had almost 
complete control of the Workers’, Soldiers’, and Landless Peasants’ Soviets in Latvia.”18  The 
same calls for self-determination that were uttered by Lenin were repeated by local political 
groups, and spread ideas that the local population can and should chose their fate, and by 
extension, their own form of government.   
Before the Bolshevist coup, the fall of the tsar led to an attempted autonomous district 
of Livonia in modern day Latvia. The existing ruling institutions of the tsarist regime of 
administration collapsed after the February Revolution, and the new government’s authority 
was questioned as Baltic calls for self-determination took form.   Kerensky’s government was 
too weak to prevent the creation of administrative bodies in Livonia even though he refused to 
recognize an autonomous Latvia.19  The provisional government was pre-occupied with the 
political power struggle with Petrograd’s Bolsheviks and the war, so it ”could not prevent 
trained Latvians from assuming most of the duties of administration or from creating an 
independent Governmental Council in South Livonia.”20  This development allowed for Latvia’s 
political leaders and population to recognize that they are not fully dependent on Russia.  South 
Livonia’s Governmental Council was not officially recognized as the autonomous government of 
Latvia, but it acted as the central government in the small unoccupied area.21  They were 
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responsible for maintaining a general sense of public order in the chaotic region just miles from 
the German army, showcasing the first example of autonomous rule in Latvia.22   
The Provisional government in Petrograd was unable to maintain its authority in Estonia 
as well.  Demonstrating their approval for ideas of self-determination, the Estonian nationalist 
and socialist leaders asked for autonomy.  Approximately 150,000 Estonians paraded through 
Petrograd in front of the Tauride Palace demanding autonomy.23  The Decree of March 30, 1917 
by the Provisional Government granted Estonia the right to autonomous self-government.24 
Estonia would now learn to function as an autonomous territory; the precursor for 
independence because there would already be a historical precedent of self-rule in place.  New 
government institutions were created with Estonian national leaders, such as Jean Poska as the 
High Commissioner.  The new law allowed the formation of an Estonian National Council (called 
“guberniya” by the Russians) to preside over Estonia and the northern part of Livonia.25  These 
actions “brought de facto recognition of autonomy in Estonia,” for the very first time.26  The 
clause of the Provisional Government’s decree that best described the newly gained 
autonomous powers is written as follows:  
 The guberniya commissar, together with the temporary guberniya zemstvo council, shall 
 be responsible for: a) management of the affairs of local self-government in the 
                                                          
22
 Riga fell afterwards in August of 1917.  The German occupation of Riga brought with it different governing 
institutions in Latvia while scaring the Estonians of an approaching front.    
23









 guberniya and of the zemstvo economy, b) management of affairs of the general 
 administration…general zemstvo taxes on the basis of existing laws…27  
Estonia had never existed as a state or an autonomous area. It used to be part of Livland or 
Livonia, so creating autonomous government institutions was a big step towards independence.  
Autonomous rule gave Estonian political leaders some experience with self-determination that 
would be echoed in their independence declarations.   
Both American and Russian touting of self-determination for small nations were 
repeated in the Baltic independence declarations.  One such national minority that declared 
independence on the basis of self-determination on November 29, 1917 was Lithuania.28  The 
Lithuanian National Council’s declaration echoed the same principles that Lenin had been 
preaching about the evils of annexation and the right of self-determination.  It read: 
In consideration of the fact that Lithuania was annexed to Russia by force and has never 
ceased to demand independence, even by armed force…that it has been shamefully 
oppressed and mistreated by the Tsarist government for 120 years…the National 
Council of Lithuania…declares that the Lithuanian nation considers itself free and 
unconstrained by any ties with the Russian state.29  
The Lithuanian manifesto uses similar language to Lenin’s “Decree on Peace” by stating that 
there were violent tactics used to maintain the province, which makes it annexation as defined 
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by Lenin.  A very similar resolution that also used self-determination based language was 
passed by the Estonian National Council after the October Russian Revolution.  Once local 
Estonian Soviets briefly took power in Tallinn, the Council met on November 28, 1917.  It 
passed a resolution proclaiming it the supreme power: 
On the basis of the self determination of nations…whereas in Russia the state 
power…has been completely destroyed and no central authority exists which the 
subdivisions of the state could obey…the Estonian Maanoukogu [National Council] 
proclaims that…it has the sole supreme power to enact laws and regulations which all in 
Estonia must obey.30   
By using similar language and definitions of annexation, these declarations serve as examples of 
how the same notions of self-determination perpetuated by the Russian Bolsheviks were used 
by the Baltic States in their independence movements.   
From the American perspective, the start of the Great War also began the Baltic pleas 
for the United States to take action on the side of Baltic self-determination.  Due to the large 
number of Lithuanians in America after the Lithuanian diaspora, a logical place to begin asking 
for outside help was in the United States.  The use of petitions by Baltic descendants in the U.S. 
began before the U.S. joined the Allies in World War I.  The first American-Lithuanian petition 
that was brought before Wilson’s attention came during the Spring of 1915.  It contained one 
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million signatures urging American support of an autonomous Lithuanian state.31  Thus, Wilson 
was aware that problems were arising in Russia’s Baltic Provinces and those problems would 
have to be dealt with after the war.32  The following year, the Lithuanian Alliance of America 
reflected the local change in demands from autonomy to independence.  On June 10th, they 
adopted a resolution asking the U.S. government to recognize their right “to be independent 
and to choose any form of government which these races consider best suited to 
themselves.”33 They were asking the U.S. government to recognize their right to self-
determination.   
The Lithuanians and other Baltic nationalist governments had reason to believe that 
Woodrow Wilson may help in their nationalist cause because of early signs of support.  In 1916, 
during the midst of the fighting, Wilson supported the House of Representatives in issuing a 
proclamation setting November 1st as “Lithuania Day.”34  The proclamation states that 
November 1st will be “a day upon which the people of the United States may make 
contributions as they feel disposed for the aid of the stricken Lithuanian people.”35  This help 
was intended for the war stricken area and did not necessarily mean that the U.S. government 
supported a state of Lithuania.  However, Wilson proclaimed November 1st as “Lithuania Day,” 
not “Western Russia Day.”  This acknowledgement of the existence of a “Lithuania” by both the 
legislative and executive branch of the U.S. government, even before the Treaty of Brest-
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Litovsk, was significant.  It was a sign that a big and influential Western power knew such a 
place existed and was willing to extend help, even if it was only through monetary humanitarian 
aid. 
Due to the popularity of Wilson’s championing of the rights of small nations, both 
Estonia and Lithuania announced their declarations of independence to diplomatic 
representatives of the U.S. in advance.36  Although Washington had received some requests for 
support of Lithuanian independence, the first active step toward seeking recognition based on 
self-determination was a proclamation by the Taryba forwarded to D.C. on February 9, 1918.37   
Both Secretary of State Robert Lansing and President Woodrow Wilson received letters from 
the Taryba with their declaration of independence and a request for recognition.38 The Taryba 
proclaimed:  
…the restoration of a Lithuanian independent state, with Vilnius for its capitals and the 
freeing of that state from all bonds whatever they may be previously entered into with 
or forced upon by the neighboring states… It has an existence of its own which is only 
waiting for international recognition in order to become fully sovereign.39   
Contrary to the State Department’s wishes, Lithuania’s position, as well as that of the other two 
Baltic State, was made clear and former U.S. hopes of an autonomous state in a federal Russia 
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were pushed aside.  Now the State Department had to deal with demands that the right to self-
determination be upheld.  
President Wilson’s non recognition policy surprised the hopeful Baltic diplomats.  This 
shock was primarily caused by Wilson’s contradictory self-determination policy for which he 
claimed all people have a right to.  Zigfrids Meierovics, Latvia’s Foreign Minister at the time, 
sums up the general Baltic sentiment when he says, “it was to be expected that the United 
States would be the first to recognize the national states which were coming to make use of the 
principles proclaimed by President Wilson.”40  Not formally recognizing the independence of 
the Baltic States seemed like, and essentially was, a contradiction of Wilson’s esteemed 
principles of self-determination. 
Chapter 2: WWI and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 
World War I brought with it many external forces that created unstable conditions in 
the Baltics.  As a part of the eastern front, the Baltic States gained a new opportunity for 
nationalist aspirations.  Whilst fighting for a losing Russian Army, Baltic allegiance to the 
Russian throne and Provisional Government were tested.  Oncoming German soldiers caused 
massive evacuations and the presence of both Russian soldiers alongside German soldiers 
further complicated the Baltic political situation.  The removal of the Kerensky administration 
by the Bolsheviks in Russia was mirrored in the Baltics even though they were preoccupied with 
a German invasion. Troublesome negotiations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk were yet another 
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external factor that had important consequences for the Baltics by separating the region from 
Russia. 
As a part of the Russian Empire, Baltic soldiers fought alongside Russian troops in World 
War I.  The eastern front was primarily on Latvian soil.  Latvian and Russian soldiers showed 
their initial solidarity by fighting against German forces together, as a united multiethnic state.  
About 180,000 Latvians were serving in the Russian army at the onset of WWI.41  Although the 
frontline eventually went all the way to Petrograd’s circumference, causing the Bolsheviks to 
relocate to Moscow, most of the fighting and local damages were inflicted upon Baltic soil.  This 
made the locals even more aware of the devastating situation caused by the war than their 
larger and stronger Russian cousins.42 War weariness brought about beliefs that any regime 
change would improve their situation, whether it was brought about by Lenin’s promise of 
bread and peace, or secession from a warring government.   
As in any war torn area, the Baltics experienced political chaos as a result of World War 
I, but also had to deal with regime change following the Russian Revolutions.  The front line 
literally separated the Baltics from Petrograd’s leadership battle by battle, creating an 
opportunity for independence that had not existed before. The political groups that stayed 
behind would now become the forces of change.  Historian Tönu Parming notes, “the 1917 
Revolutions in Russia resulted in the appearance of a large vacuum in governmental authority, 
the collapse of centralized political power.  The tsarist state and its successors were in chaos, 
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and in the Baltic unable to cope with the military encroachments of the Kaiser’s Germany.”43 By 
1915, all of Lithuania and the province of Kurland were occupied.  German armies continued to 
push into Russia’s Baltic Provinces with the fall of Tsar Nicholas II and kept getting close to Riga 
once the February Revolution propped up the Provisional Government. 
 The chaotic conditions of the war met with evacuations that created new opportunities 
for leadership.  Approximately half of Latvia’s population left between 1915 and 1917.44  
Approaching German armies and retreating Russian soldiers ravaged the area and split Latvia 
apart between German occupied territory and land still controlled by Russia’s central 
government.  Some Latvians and Lithuanians left the Baltic Sea area for inner Russia to escape 
German rule.45 The moving frontline was followed by an influx of Russian soldiers into the 
region to defend Russia’s borders. Due to the war effort continuing even after the February 
Revolution, large numbers of Russian troops were stationed in the area, having an input in local 
disputes.  Tönu Parming explains that in both Latvia and Estonia, “a sizable proportion of the 
radical left consisted of non-natives, generally Russians, both in the ranks of industrial workers, 
as Baltic industry expanded to fill tsarist war-production needs, and in the ranks of the 
military.”46  Those soldiers brought with them the sociopolitical ideas and developments from 
inner Russia to its periphery.  
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 After toppling the Provisional Government during the October Revolution, Lenin and his 
followers had to find a way out of WWI.  An armistice was concluded between Imperial 
Germany and Bolshevik Russia at the beginning of December, 1917 and peace negotiations 
began shortly afterwards.  The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was negotiated by Trotsky, the Bolshevik 
government’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and tried to keep in line with Bolshevik rhetoric 
but failed in that aspect.  During the negotiations, Trotsky asked for a peace without 
annexations because they were inherently conflicting with Bolshevik principles of self-
determination mentioned earlier.   
The fact that the Bolsheviks had control over the leadership in the Baltics is just that, a 
fact. After the October Revolution, soviet governments sprang up in Estonia and the 
unoccupied provinces of Latvia, but they were short-lived because of advancing German armies 
and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.47 Lenin’s peace at any cost tactics sacrificed an area in which his 
own party already had consolidated a lot of power after the October Revolution.  Yet they did 
face some opposition with the growing power of nationalists using self-determination as cause 
for secession.  In war torn and separated Latvia, the Bolsheviks repeatedly reminded their 
supporters that, “the success of a socialist revolution in Latvia depended on the victorious 
emergence of a socialist revolution in the whole of Russia.”48  In his writings, Latvian Bolshevik 
leader Peteris Štucka said that Latvia depended on Russia, but even he made the distinction 
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between Latvia and Russia; they were two distinct and separate areas.  Such hints would 
indicate that he viewed Latvia as autonomous, even while a part of socialist Russia.   
The Latvian Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Peteris Štucka, saw the nationality 
question as something to be worked on within the framework of proletarian internationalism 
and close ties to the Russian government.  The Latvian Social Democratic party was composed 
of mainly Bolsheviks, and had strong connections to Lenin and the Petrograd Bolsheviks.  
Andrew Ezergailis, wrote about the differences between the 1905 and 1917 revolutions in 
Latvia, pointing out that the Social Democrats were the largest Latvian party and “had 
reoriented their thinking away from national concerns to social ones”49  However, that does not 
mean that national concerns were erased by any means.  The Latvian Bolsheviks “adhered to 
the ideology of friendship among nations, relying on V.I. Lenin’s theory on national problems 
and proletarian internationalism.”50  The connection between Latvian political leaders and 
Lenin made them push for a centralized state, and not ask for independence while they 
remained in power.  Štucka wrote in “Nacionalais jautajums un latviesu proletariats,” “we love 
a Russian, Jewish, Estonian, Lithuanian etc. worker not because he is a Russian, Jew, etc., but 
because he is a worker.  Such is the faith of Latvia’s communists regarding the nationality 
question.”51  On a very similar note, Štucka also wrote, “we are against all nationalism… only 
those who can become enthusiastic about national federations have not understood, or do not 
want to understand the significance of class struggle.”52  This is how the Latvian Bolsheviks tried 
to solve the nationality question in Latvia the same way Lenin did in Russia; by emphasizing that 
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the struggle was over class rather than nationality, even though the two categories were 
intertwined.   
The German invasion allowed Latvian nationalists the opportunity to call for 
independence.  Russian troops abandoned their posts and socialist Latvian forces that were 
outnumbered yet unwilling to surrender to German troops retreated to inner Russia.53  Russian 
leaders headed back eastward and “at this critical moment removed the last vestiges of the 
authority of the Russian state in the Baltic Provinces.”54  Reformist nationalists had less Russian 
and Latvian Bolsheviks around to preach the benefits of a centralized workers’ state led by 
Petrograd.  The fleeing of many radicalized Russians meant that there would be less opposition 
to Baltic independence.  The Bolsheviks were losing their constituencies in the occupied areas, 
making united Baltic and Russian soviet governments unlikely.  The nationalist reformers that 
stayed behind, and with some émigrés, were able to call for the creation of their own state.55   
Before the peace treaty was negotiated, guarantees against German aggression were 
yet another concern for Baltic nationalists.  In 1918, the Baltic States were saturated with both 
German, and Red Army soldiers.  German ploys to create puppet states on the coast were 
rumored and seemed to be true.  An example of this occurred when an Estonian member of the 
Constituent Assembly came to a British Foreign Minister in Petrograd seeking British advice and 
protection.  The Germans allegedly offered to guarantee Estonian independence if the 
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nationalist forces were to accept a German protectorate.56  Presumably, the Germans either 
would or already have made similar offers to both Latvian and Lithuanian nationalists as well.57  
This was a familiar predicament- the choice between German or Russian rule.  Fear of German 
aggression made the Baltics turn to the West for recognition, and thereby protection, while 
German wishes for puppet states made the Western nations suspicious of the real agents of 
power in the proclaimed independent republics.   
 In charge of Russian foreign affairs, Trotsky handled the negotiations and tried to stretch 
out talks to provide more time for an international communist revolution.  The Bolsheviks 
believed the proletariat revolution would spread to the Central Powers from their Western 
Provinces, especially to industrialized Germany.58  Keeping the Baltic Provinces not only would 
have given the Bolsheviks more territory to rule over, but also would be a possible influence on 
neighboring Germany and Scandinavia.  On February 10, 1918 Trotsky made an unheard-of 
diplomatic move by not signing the peace treaty while simultaneously announcing 
demobilization.59 Trotsky tried to solve his dilemma of waiting for a proletariat revolution in 
Germany while dealing with a world war with the “neither-peace-nor-war” solution.60  Unhappy 
with Trotsky’s bold move, Germany continued its war effort once more by moving its armies 
further into Russia on February 18, 1918.61  Lenin wanted an immediate peace treaty with 
Germany so he could fulfill his promise of ending the war.  Frustrated with the peace 
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negotiations, Lenin pushed for making a final peace, even if that meant allowing Germany to 
annex its former territory, the Baltic Provinces, while German soldiers marched northward.   
 Facing the inevitable approach of German forces and power struggles with Soviets, the 
nationalist Estonian government declared independence.  Before German soldiers took Tallinn, 
Konstantin Päts, Jüri Vilms and Konstantin Konik, Estonian politicians on behalf of the Estonian 
National Council, declared the existence of an independent Estonia on February 23, 1918.62  
Facing an approaching frontline without having adequate defensive forces made such a 
declaration easier, and seemingly futile, for the National Council because they had nothing to 
lose.  The German army was going to occupy Estonia anyway, so the declaration stood as just a 
formally stated position of how the Estonians now thought of themselves; as an independent 
entity, separate from the Russian Empire.  
 The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was seen as a humiliating defeat to the Bolsheviks, but Lenin 
argued for it to pass because it was necessary to end the German invasion.  Lenin issued the 
“Decree on the Socialist Fatherland in Danger” after German armies kept advancing once peace 
talks paused and the army was too close to Petrograd.63  On February 23, 1918, the Germans 
laid out their terms for peace, demanding all of the territory its troops had seized, including the 
Baltics.  In the end, the Baltic Bolsheviks that managed to escape German invasion were 
betrayed by their leaders in Petrograd by the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.  “Some 
Latvian Rifles even threatened an independent war against the Germans if Lenin concluded that 
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peace.”64  Reminiscing upon his time in power, Štucka, “made clear that his party had never 
really become reconciled to the notion of a separate state.  He stressed they had never used 
the slogan 'an independent Latvia' because they laughed at the very notion; 'in the era of 
imperialism', he reminded his readers, 'the independence of tiny nations was nothing more 
than a diplomatic deception, while in the era of socialism it would be quite unnecessary.'”65    
Bolshevik leaders in the Baltics wanted a centralized Russian state under their control, but the 
treaty would legally bind the Baltics to Germany.  Rather than become a “diplomatic 
deception,” the independence of those small states as a result of the Peace Treaty took away 
long-standing Russian influences that had possessed the sole juridical rights of sovereignty.66   
The formal separation of the Baltic States was brought about by World War I and the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.  The peace treaty was signed on March 3, 1918 with a significant loss for 
Russia.  The Bolsheviks agreed to give up 1,267,000 square miles of territory with 62 million 
people in it.67  The legal separation of the Baltic States from Russia is evident in Article III, which 
states that the, “territories lying to the west of the line agreed upon by the contracting parties 
which formerly belonged to Russia, will no longer be subject to Russian sovereignty.”68  The 
Soviet Executive passed the peace proposal by a vote of 116 to 85 even though Lenin was called 
a “traitor” from the Left SRs, a Russian political group, and some members on the left wing of 
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his own party.69  The treaty isolated the remaining Bolsheviks in the Baltics, which allowed for 
nationalist reformers in the area to form their own government institutions under limited 
German protection. 
Chapter 3: The Peace Conference Formation of U.S. Foreign Policy 
Initial U.S. policy towards the Baltics formed during WWI.  That policy was founded by 
the external forces that allowed Baltic nationalists to come to power.  The (White) Russian 
Ambassador in the U.S. and certain American diplomats once more changed the Baltic political 
situation.  Before the Peace Conference, Baltic pleas for international recognition of their 
independence were neglected as U.S. policy in the region revolved around their optimistic 
prediction of a White Russian victory in the ensuing Civil War.  At the Peace Conference, the 
Allied Powers nullified the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and once again that external action brought 
about more chaos in the Baltics.  The presence of German troops, more favorable to Baltic 
nationalists than Russian troops, had maintained a small amount of Baltic stability because it 
kept the Russian Civil War, and the Red Army soldiers that came with it, away from the coast.  
The retreat of German soldiers is what caused internal instability to flare up again and the Civil 
War to expand, but it ultimately stopped the Baltics from becoming German puppet states.   
It took the United States four years after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to extend full 
recognition to the Baltic States because the U.S. had close ties with Russia during WWI.  
Individual U.S. diplomats had different view on the independence of the Baltic States and 
chaotic political conditions made it difficult to understand which faction was in charge.  Most 
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importantly, the U.S. believed that Russia would shed Bolshevism rather quickly and become a 
large and powerful state, which included the Baltics, once more.   
The prevalence of certain Russian diplomats, such as Boris Bakhmetev, also slowed 
down the recognition process.  Before the October Revolution, Kerensky’s ambassador to the 
United States paid a visit to Washington on July 7th.  Bakhmetev “made it immediately clear 
that neither mutual affection nor trust would prevail if the U.S. started advocating 
dismemberment of Russia.”70  In response, Baltic representatives claimed that they should be 
able to decide their own fate.71  However, they had yet to declare independence and would not 
have legitimate institutions that allowed for their self-government until the aftermath of the 
October Revolution.   
Arguments by each Russian government for retention of the Baltic States were strategic 
as well as economic, appealing to America’s need for a strong Russian ally and a peaceful 
Europe.  This was done primarily by pitting the Baltics as necessary for defense against further 
German aggression.  Although Russian aggression in the area was evident to the Baltic 
nationalists and they tried to make it as obvious to the State Department, Germany’s aggressive 
tendencies were cause for more concern in the aftermath of WWI.  The Tsarist, Provisional, and 
Bolshevik governments all argued that the retention of the Baltic littoral was critical for Russia 
for two main reasons: “1, the Baltic area could be used as a springboard for aggression against 
Russia, and 2, its possession by Russia provided an indispensable security zone for her.”72  It is 
difficult to determine whether each Russian government actually believed the Baltic States 
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were so important, but the argument was that the Baltics were inseparable from Russia 
because secession would undermine its national defense.   
Those closest to the region, i.e. the local Baltic population, knew that the area was not 
critical for Russia’s national defense by their experience during World War I.  Although Kaiser 
Wilhelm’s Imperial Army came close to Petrograd, the war left Russia proper in-tact.  In the 
winter of 1918, a demoralized German Army was able to capture 1172 Bolshevik officers and 
16,000 enlisted men in the Livonia and Estonia region, with only 20 killed and wounded soldiers 
of their own.73  No strategic military reversals occurred in the Baltic States.  For an area that it 
considered so critical for self-defense, it seems puzzling that Russia would not be willing to 
properly defend the Baltic defense zone that allowed the German Army to cross all of Lithuania 
and Kurland, to the Daugava River outside of Riga in just one campaign in 1915.74  Resistance 
was so low in this esteemed Russian buffer, that, “in Kurland, German cavalry patrols took 
whole towns virtually without firing a shot.”75  The Baltics were more like a playground for 
soldiers to intersect and burn land when a direction, either towards or away from Russia or 
Germany, was already established by decisive battles elsewhere.   
America’s ties with Russia hindered any willingness the U.S. may have had to recognize 
the new republics.  Immediate difficulties for recognition were directly related to Russia’s role 
in World War I.  Albert Tarulis explains that, “were there U.S. to support openly the separatist 
tendencies among the non-Russians, it would have lost not only Russian friendship, but also 
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Russian military contribution to the common struggle against Germany and her allies.”76  It was 
clearly not in the interest of the United States to upset an ally.  The obvious focus was on 
winning the Great War and Russian soldiers were necessary, so Russia could not be abandoned. 
To help configure U.S. policy toward Russia, Elihu Root was sent on a diplomatic mission during 
the summer of 1917.  He confirmed the idea that if the U.S. showed sympathy for Russia and 
did not support its dismemberment, he expected that Russia would stay in the war.77  All of this 
occurred before the October Russian Revolution, before Russia left the war.  However, U.S. 
policy of supporting Russia’s interests remained the same.  The U.S. still would not openly 
support Russia’s dismemberment after its role in WWI diminished.   
America’s determination to have close ties with Russia was expressed even after the 
Bolsheviks made a separate peace.  Exemplifying the close knit relationship, in 1918, U.S. 
Ambassador Francis stated,  
I shall not leave Russia until forced to depart.  My Government and the American people 
are too deeply interested in the welfare of the Russian people to abandon the country 
and leave its people to the mercles [SIC] of Germany.  We shall do all possible…to 
protect and preserve the integrity of this great country.78  
Even when Russia was no longer aiding the Allies in Germany’s defeat, the U.S. maintained its 
determination to have an ally in Russia. 
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Robert Lansing’s downplaying of the situation in the Baltics and his optimism in Great 
Russia’s revival became the bedrock of America’s “do-nothing policy.”  Albert Tarulis asserts, 
“Lansing was aware of the centrifugal forces at work in Russia, but belittled them.”79  He, like 
Wilson, seemed to think that the Baltic question would answer itself quickly.  Lansing’s 
diplomatic capabilities went beyond mere deferment as evidenced by his work as Secretary of 
State after the end of the Great War.  However, his policy, as well as Colby’s, maintained one of 
deferment until the question would answer itself.  Since he thought that Russia was only 
temporarily disintegrated, deferment seemed like the only logical solution.80  The rise of the 
Bolsheviks and the October Russian Revolution surprised the Western world, so it seemed 
natural that such a strange force would not last long and the Russia the U.S. was familiar with, 
an Ally during wartime, would soon return.  In his war memoirs, Lansing wrote that he 
suggested a “do nothing policy,” “until the black period of terrorism ends and the rising tide of 
blood has run its course,” and in the meantime, America should “see to it that Russia’s interests 
are safeguarded.”81  After all, he did not want to involve the United States in more of Europe’s 
conflicts than he had to as isolationism’s popularity rose.82  It made no sense to focus on some 
tiny Baltic States seeking independence recognition when Germany had to be defeated and 
Western Europe had to be taken care of.  
Lansing’s views on the relationship between Russia and the Baltic States cemented U.S. 
policy during his term.  He made up his mind September 9, 1918 before the war was over, that 
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the Baltic States should be, “autonomous states of a Russian confederation, and that the Brest-
Litovsk peace treaty should be completely abrogated or denounced along with all treaties 
relating to Russian territory.”83  As Secretary of State, Lansing’s views of the proper role of the 
Baltics were critical, and with Wilson’s approval, were the official expressed views of the 
American government.  He saw an autonomous Baltic region within a strong Russia as a suitable 
solution.  Theoretically, it could have appeased Baltic nationalists while not interfering with the 
strength of a Russian ally.  The idea of a confederation was less likely to displease the Russians, 
“who were inclined to concede to the Baltic peoples no more than a weak autonomy.”84  Once 
established, such views remained until Lansing’s resignation.    On October 5, 1918, Lansing 
assured Bakhmetev that the position of his government had not changed and its objective was 
to assist Russia.85  In the conflict between the Baltic nationalists and Russians who wanted to 
maintain their territorial integrity, Lansing’s allegiance was with Russia, and Bakhmetev. 
Certain U.S. officials held different views of the role the Baltics could play in 
international politics that would support their independence.  One such role the Baltic States 
could, and were willing to, play was that of a buffer state.  Lieutenant Colonel Warwick Greene, 
Chief of the U.S. Mission to the Baltic Provinces, thought the Baltic States would make a great 
buffer between two rivals, Russia and Germany.86  The delicate balance of power checking 
European ambitions after World War I was just that- delicate.  In trying to solve the Baltic 
problem, the council of foreign Ministers decided to send food, equipment, and arms to the 
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Baltic States at the end of 1919.87  Yet the idea of buffer states to dampen any further 
annexationist wishes was appealing.  Not only did Germany invade Russia, but Russian troops 
also invaded East Prussia through the Nemunas River and moved towards Konigsberg and 
Danzig during the first couple months of WWI.88  Recent aggressive tendencies that went 
through Baltic lands were not only from the side of the Germans, so they were prime 
contestants for buffer states between powerful neighbors.  Greene’s support of Baltic buffer 
states was also embedded in checking Bolshevik expansion.89  Claims of an international 
proletariat revolution were reason enough to support efforts to the contrary.  Although no one 
in the State Department was in favor of Bolshevik expansion, they continued to believe the 
communist revolution would end on its own accord and was not a real threat CITE.  U.S. foreign 
policy only acknowledged the Russia of 1917, and therefore any attempt toward recognition 
without a powerful Russian government that the U.S. recognized would be futile.90  The 
proximity of Greene’s position to Soviet Russia made him more afraid of the Bolsheviks, and 
therefore more supportive of independent Baltic States, than U.S. diplomats sitting behind their 
desks at the State Department, far removed from any Red Army soldiers.     
America’s wish for a strong Russia even put the country at odds with Great Britain when 
it came to the question of the Baltic States.  American support of Baltic independence would 
make the U.S. assume “moral responsibility for their protection” and further British trade 
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disguised as buffer states.91  Siding with the British in setting up a Baltic buffer zone would 
neither help U.S. economic interest nor their diplomatic relations with non-Bolshevik Russia.  In 
response to suggestions of Russia’s dismemberment to prevent a Bolshevik Russian menace, 
Lansing replied with a strong moral and strategic pro-Russian stance.  Referencing Lloyd 
George’s idea of extending recognition to form an anti-Bolshevik alliance of independent states 
from Estonia to the Caucasus, Lansing claimed it would be “a moral wrong and would pave the 
way for conflicts in the future.”92  More importantly to U.S. interests, Lansing wrote, “a divided 
Russia… would be a far greater menace to the British Empire than would be a united 
democratic Russia, well able to defend itself, but not disposable to attack.”93  Such reminders of 
a need for a strong Russia that the U.S. can count on as an ally broadly rejected other 
approaches toward the Bolsheviks, like the formation of a chain of independent states.   
The Russian Ambassador made his feelings about the separatist Baltic States known 
once again before the Peace Conference.  Although no reply was given, Bakhmetev was a 
recognized Russian diplomat and that role alone made his voice in D.C. heard.  Although Russia 
was in a Civil War, Bakhmetev was invited to present the Russian view on the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk that allowed the Baltic States to officially separate from the empire and gave them 
certain freedoms although they frequently interfered with the newly established indigenous 
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Baltic governments.94  He submitted a statement of peace terms regarding Russia that he 
wanted to present at the Peace Conference that included the following two conclusions: 
1. Exterior unconditional abrogation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and all other 
agreements concluded by the German Government after Nov. 7 1917, either with 
the authorities acting in the name of Russia [the Bolsheviks] or with whatever 
National or Political groups claiming to represent authority over any territory of the 
former Russian Empire. 
2. Evacuation of German troops from the territory of the former Russain Empire…95  
It was no coincidence that anti-Bolshevik Russian organizations in the U.S. were also 
“bombarding the State Department and White House with petitions and appeals favoring 
adherence to the principle of a ‘one and indivisible Russia’ and portraying Baltic leaders of 
independence as German puppets.”96  Bakhmetev knew that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had to 
be voided in order to keep the Baltic States a part of the Empire as the treaty legally separated 
it.  German authorities did in fact allow local governments to organize and even allowed the 
Taryba, which set up strong networks of sovereignty support and independent institutions, to 
form.97  Characterizing the Baltic nationalists as German puppets, their claims to self-
determination would seem unauthentic and not gain any traction in the United States.  If 
Bakhmetev could get Wilson and the State Department to see the Baltic leaders as marionettes 
                                                          
94
 Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace, 335. 
95
 Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, December 13, 1918, FRUS, 
1919, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol.II (Washington: GPO), 476, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/ 
FRUS.FRUS1919Parisv02. 
96
 Tarulis, American-Baltic Relations, 90. 
97
 E. H. C. Loudon, “Lithuania’s Struggle for Recognition” The Baltic Review, 345, in RG 59. 
36 
 
of the German Kaiser, it would make U.S. support for their independence very unlikely. 
Recognition pleas and recommendations in the Baltic Commission were blocked, “by the firm 
commitment of Italy and particularly the United States to the territorial integrity of Russia.”98  
Bakhmetev’s influence was affirmed when the Allies called for the renunciation of the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk and the removal of German soldiers from former Russian lands under the 
Armistice ending World War I.  
Chapter 4: The Russian Civil War 
Expansion of the Civil War into the Baltics after the Versailles Peace Treaty created 
havoc for the young indigenous governments that were somewhat protected by the presence 
of German troops.  In this manner, more and more militant factions began fighting in the region 
and word got back to the U.S. State Department that the situation was serious.  Diplomatic 
views of different ambassadors from both Russia and the U.S. stopped the State Department 
from answering Baltic recognition and assistance requests.  U.S. involvement in Russia’s Civil 
War in the Baltics was minimal and mostly consisted of humanitarian aid.  Although seen as a 
precursor for recognition, organizations such as the American Relief Administration were rather 
used as a substitute.99  Such relief efforts still continued Baltic hopes for U.S. recognition of 
their independence.  Ultimately, peace treaties were signed by each Baltic government with the 
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Soviet Russians as local fighting dwindled from external intervention in Russia proper (mainly 
from Great Britain) and Baltic nationalists forces pushed out White Russian troops.100  
 The difficulty in determining the true placement of power from so many competing 
political factions during the Civil War can be exemplified by recognition pleas from nationalists 
becoming more desperate.  Pleas, declarations, petitions, and appeals submitted to the U.S. 
government by the newly enfranchised Baltic leaders before Fall of 1918, only asked for moral 
support for their independence.101  Article XII of the Armistice Convention directed all German 
troops in former Russian territory to retreat, “as soon as the Allies shall think the moment 
suitable having regard to the internal situation of these territories.”102  Reports had made it 
clear that the internal situation of these territories was a mess.103  Without having consent from 
the Allies, defeated and hungry German troops began to retreat, violating Article XII of the 
Armistice, while the Russian Civil War was at a peak in the Baltic States.  The newly formed 
provisional government of Lithuania appealed to the Allies on November 11, 1918 via radio, 
“for aid against Bolshevik danger as Red Army troops began to move into the vacuum left by 
withdrawing Germans.”104  The increase of political instability in the Baltic States that resulted 
from the end of WWI is reflected in the changing aid requests to the United States.  
With a German communist revolution taking place in Berlin, the Red Army was 
instructed to convert the Baltic Sea to a “Soviet Sea” that could influence revolutions in 
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Scandinavia and Germany alike.105  During December of 1918, the Council of People’s 
Commissars and the Central Executive committee of the Soviets of Worker, Soldier, and 
Peasant Deputies even recognized the Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.106  
Under Soviet rule, recognition by the U.S. was impossible and although the true extent of Soviet 
power in the area is doubtful at the very least due to reports of intensive yet unsuccessful 
Bolshevik campaigns, the soviet presence created more desperate conditions for Baltic 
nationalists.107  Maintaining hope, the American Lithuanian National Council submitted a long 
telegram to the State Department now requesting not only independence, but also for 
American troops to occupy Lithuania.108  Although no reply was given, there was recognition of 
receipt.  There were repeated requests for recognition of the newly organized State Council of 
Lithuania as the provisional government of an independent Lithuanian state but there was no 
reply.109  The continuous silence in Washington suggests uncertainty, and constantly changing 
hands of power in the area support that uncertainty.   
The event that came to be known as Estonia’s War of Independence from late 
November, 1918 to March, 1919, showcases the confusing multitude of agents involved in 
various armed conflicts of the time period.  Most of these groups were from areas surrounding 
the Baltics and expanded local instability due to their fighting.  This particular battle consisted 
of the following groups: Estonian and Latvian nationalists, backed by most of the local 
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population and by the Entente, the British Navy, British and French advisers, Finnish volunteers, 
White Russian armies under several commanders, Polish forces, the Landeswehr force, an “Iron 
Division” of German mercenaries, Estonian and Latvian Bolsheviks, the Red Army, and the 
Latvian Rifles.110  The Baltic Germans were trying to retain their influence and privileges dating 
back to the Teutonic Knights, the Bolsheviks and their sympathizers wanted to set up a Soviet 
state, and the nationalists and their sympathizers were trying to retain their claim to 
independent statehood.   
It was difficult for the United States government to fully trust and understand the 
confusing political situation in the Baltics, Latvia in particular.  The Latvians faced a peculiar 
situation because Latvia had more notable pro-Bolshevik tendencies.  The U.S. government was 
in no way likely to recognize and form diplomatic relations with a small soviet state if it was not 
going to even recognize the more powerful Bolshevik Russian government.  The Red Army’s 
commander in chief was a Latvian, and ethnic Latvians made up a majority of the cheka.111  In 
Soviet military history, only one Baltic military group would have prominent mention, the 
Latvian Riflemen.  Their fame for consolidating Lenin’s power and being a significant section of 
the Red Army is well known.  Regiments of the Riflemen had once formed the Kremlin Guard, 
and were critical to keeping Lenin in power at the beginning of 1918.112   
However, the U.S. General Staff’s Intelligence Division published a guidebook on Latvia 
in 1919 that said Latvians have a nationalist movement and are more pro-Allies, rather than 
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pro-Bolshevik.113  Although the guidebook shows that the U.S. government saw Latvia’s struggle 
as a nationalist one, its Bolshevist leanings and support of the Iskolaat government under 
Štucka, is difficult to ignore.  Reports that the Latvian capital of Riga is under the control of 
Bolsheviks because of uprisings comprised of “some Lettish” that were using British supplied 
arms further blurred the true stance of Latvian sentiment.114  Bolshevik tendencies of each of 
the Baltic States could be questioned by association and fed into the concept of a united Russia. 
The set-up of soviet regimes along the Baltic coast during the Russian Civil War naturally made 
the Western powers hesitate even more when considering the recognition of Baltic 
independence.  The Allies, the United States in particular, did not want another Bolshevik 
government and had legitimate reason to question whether the Baltics, especially Latvia, would 
ultimately become socialist states. 
Frequent skirmishes and changing hands of power that included many actors made it 
difficult for distant states to know exactly which agents were holding a solid majority of power 
in the area.  Different alliances were made.  For example, Estonian nationalists sided with some 
White Russians to drive back the Red Army in May of 1919.  Afterwards, General Nikolai 
Yudenich assumed command of Russian forces and the Estonian troops moved south to help 
the Latvian nationalists fight the Baltic German and White Russian allied forces under Colonel 
Bermondt-Avalov in Riga.115  By November, as Yudenich’s army was retreating from Petrograd 
to Estonia, his forces were disarmed and disbanded by the nationalists because he refused to 
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recognize the concept of Baltic independence.116  Even though the nationalist forces won and 
the Red Army was forced to retreat further and further away from Tallinn, the sheer number of 
powerful actors with different interests, made a stable consolidation of power in the hands of 
the nationalists alone unlikely. 
 During the height of the Russian Civil War in the Baltics, cries for assistance and the 
safeguarding of the nationalist governments that came from recognition were ignored.  The 
need for military assistance to the Baltic nationalists that was answered by the British and 
French missions was ignored by the Americans.117  On December 20th, 1918, President Janis 
čakste of the Latvian State Council requested naval protection, arms, and munitions because of 
the, “urgent need to combat Bolsheviks who were advancing like a tide, taking hostages, 
pillaging, and levying contributions, while the Germans were purposely handing Latvia over to 
the Bolsheviks.”118  One would assume that U.S. involvement in the Russian Civil War, 
admittedly it was minimal, would extend to the Baltic nationalists as well, but that was not the 
case because nationalist aspirations would contradict the U.S. vision of a strong Russia.119  
When asked for assistance in fighting Bolshevik forces, Lansing instructed American officials to 
not give any assurances implied by advising Latvian authorities to not conclude an armistice 
with Bolshevik Russia.120  The U.S.’s decision to not intervene actually helped the Baltic 
nationalists by forcing them into peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks.  Continued fighting 
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may have led to White Russian forces gaining traction in the Civil War and eliminating any 
chances of Russian support for Baltic self-determination. 
Ambassador Bakhmetev understood the significance behind U.S. recognition and made 
it known.  According to Albert Tarulis, the Russian Ambassador reminded the U.S. that the 
“independence of small states could only be maintained artificially, through the political and 
economic support of an outside power ‘actuated by a purpose of jeopardizing the economic 
freedom of Russia and interfering with the liberty of her commercial intercourse.’”121  
Bakhmetev made the economic necessity of the Baltic States for Russia an argument that was 
sure to win over America’s sympathy.  The U.S. Division of Russian Affairs shared this view and 
deemed the economic resources of the Baltic States as insufficient to maintain “prosperous 
independence.”122  Since the U.S. believed Russia would shed Bolshevism and return to 
normalcy anyway, it could not feasibly “interfere with the liberty of her commercial 
intercourse.”  Baltic ports were described as an integral part of it. 
The economic vitality the Baltic States brought to the Russian Empire was exaggerated.  
The purpose behind such an exaggeration is twofold; if the U.S. saw the economic necessity 
ownership of the Baltic ports brought to the country, support of its dismemberment would 
decline and if the Baltic States were to be recognized as independent, they would need to 
sustain economic independence.  Great effort was put into placing the Baltic States and Russian 
Empire as mutually dependent.123  The Russian Political Conference prepared pamphlets that 
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were distributed to the Allied diplomats, newspaper officials, and the public.124  These 
pamphlets claimed the Baltic ports handled 20% of Russia’s foreign trade.125  Such a large 
portion of trade would have significant economic consequences for any country, thus making it 
difficult for anyone to support such a devastating economic blow.  With such a claim, foreign 
ministries would have to consider whether the nationalistic aspirations of a small population on 
Russia’s western borders is justification for possibly wrecking Russia’s economic health.  To 
further dramatize the economic consequences of Baltic recognition, Vassily A. Maklakov, 
Russia’s ambassador in Paris, claimed that the “absolute independence of Baltic states would 
mean Russia’s ruin economically and strategically.”126  Neither the U.S. nor the other Allied 
powers had reason to “ruin” Russia.  Since the economic vitality of Russia supposedly depended 
on the Baltic ports, recognition of the independent Baltic States would mean support of 
Russia’s decline.   
Realistically, Russia’s economy did not depend on its control of the Baltic ports.  Before 
the war, the Baltic ports only handled 1/5th of the tonnage from Russia’s foreign trade, and only 
1/6th of its value; significantly less than the original claim127  However, Russia held claim to the 
importance of those ports and their right to maintain them.  A letter from the Russian Political 
Conference explained that they would never renounce their claim to the area, because the 
geographical position of the Baltic States attached them to Russia, which had invested a lot of 
money “toward the development of ports which are indispensable to her trade.”128  
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Desperately seeking independence, the Baltic States incorporated free trade provisions in their 
peace treaties with Russia so as to make the economic dependence argument invalid.129  The 
open port assurances made by the Baltic States were disregarded in Washington.130  The policy 
of non-recognition continued, justified by the argument that the Baltic Provinces were of 
economic vitality for Russia and the Baltic States would be unable to maintain economic 
independence. 
Concerning the Baltics, the Russian Civil War was over in 1920 as each nationalist 
government signed peace treaties with the Bolsheviks.  Tired of fighting and wishing to 
maintain their independence, secret talks began with Foreign Commissioner Chicherin after 
Lloyd George persuaded his cabinet to stop supplying White Russians with arms via the Baltic 
States.131  Soviet Russia recognized Estonia’s independence and signed a Peace Treaty at Tartu 
that would keep Red Army and White Russian soldiers out of the country February 2, 1920.132  
Both Latvia and Lithuania followed suit as they sought negotiations with Chicherin and signed 
peace treaties ending the Civil War in the Baltics on August 1st and July 12, 1920, 
respectively.133  Solidifying the separation of Soviet Russia and Baltic States, Article 1 of the 
Russo-Lithuanian Peace Treaty states: 
In accordance with the declaration made by the Russian Federative Socialist Soviet 
Republic of the right belonging to all nations of free self-determination…Russia 
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unconditionally recognized the sovereignty and independence of the State of 
Lithuania…relinquishes for all time all the sovereign rights which Russia had…134 
The Treaty of Tartu and Treaty of Riga offered the same relinquishment of power to the 
indigenous governments.  This formal separation from Russia did not involve a German 
protectorate and resulted in stable governments.  Baltic leaders would no longer have to worry 
about the imminent threat of Russian invasion and could focus their energies on international 
recognition since White Russians and the U.S. still viewed the states as temporary. 
Even towards the end of the Russian Civil War, Bakhmetev maintained strongly against 
the separation of the Baltic States from the Russian Empire.  His views of the Baltic States 
mimics U.S. policy and maintain that the U.S. not recognize them for it would create a 
permanently bad relationship with Russia.  He writes,  
The only point to which Russian opinion strongly objects is the recognition of the [Baltic] 
States in a form which would legalize their separation from Russia and grant them an 
international status of complete sovereignty and independence.  Such a course, 
qualified as ‘dismemberment of Russia,’ has called for most emphatic protests from 
Russian bodies of all shades of political thought.135   
This fear of the “dismemberment of Russia” has been echoed in the State Department 
continuously in reference to any suggestions of recognizing the Baltic States.  He refers to 
Russia’s political situation as a “temporary disability” and says that recognition of the Baltic 
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States would be considered taking advantage of that temporary disability.  He continues to call 
the independent condition of the Baltic States one of the most temporary nature and writes 
“even now the Baltic States might be swept away if circumstances would warrant the 
expedience of an aggression by the Moscow Soviet.”136  Mimicking the understanding of the 
United States, Bakhmetev says the independence of the Baltic States, “would last only while 
Russia remained inarticulate.”137 
U.S. Ambassador John W. Davis held fast to the notion of an indivisible Russia.    
Ambassador Davis’ reaction to many notices from the Latvian nationalists played a role in 
watering down any support Washington may have had in recognizing the Baltic States.  From 
his post in London, he received passionate requests from the Latvian Foreign Minister, Zigfrids 
Meierovics, to inform Wilson that the Latvian government was begging him to, “save in the 
name of humanity, an entire country from murder and annihilation by organized foreign 
bands.”138  Davis’ minimum response was a blowback to Baltic nationalists.  Henri Simson, 
Latvia’s representative in London, had contact with Davis during this time of crisis.  Simson 
informed Davis that the German troops were evading Article XII of the Armistice Convention 
and evacuating Latvia without first receiving orders from the Allied powers.  Davis was also told 
that the Germans were delivering arms, munitions, and fortified posts to the Bolsheviks, and 
were, “systematically devastating the country and are pillaging and murdering in concert with 
the Russian troops who are coming in to take their place.”139  Although he was made aware of 
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the urgency the matter required, he did not dispatch the note for another ten days when 
almost all of Latvia was under Bolshevik control and also used regular mail for delivery.140  
Davis’ decision to sit on the notice does not have an explanation but it was a clear indication of 
his views.  He did not see the matter as something urgent or worthwhile for the U.S. to react to.  
If Davis had seen the case for Baltic independence as one worthy of his support, he would not 
have waited ten days to forward an enclosed translation of Simson’s notice.  Also, by choosing 
to send the letter via regular mail, Davis showed his lack of urgency.  In fact, the Ambassador’s 
letter was not received by the State Department until January 25, 1919, approximately 35 days 
after Simson’s initial notice.141   His personal message to the Acting Secretary of State was very 
short and contained more clues into his opinion of the Baltic situation.  He wrote that Simson’s 
letter contained, “a protest against the alleged violation by Germany of Article XII of the 
Armistice.”142  Without bluntly stating his opinion, Davis makes it known that he does not 
believe the “alleged” violations are taking place.  Ambassadors are a source of information for 
foreign policy and their portrayal of events has a direct and significant impact on U.S. foreign 
policy.  Without U.S. ambassadors that were aligned with the cause of the Baltic nationalists, it 
was highly unlikely that the State Department would change its policy of non-recognition.   
A change in diplomatic personality also positively changed the outlook on the Baltic 
States.  To have a better understanding of the happenings in the Baltic, Evan E. Young was 
assigned to the post of Commissioner of the United States for the Baltic Provinces of Russia in 
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1919.143  In contrast to Ambassador Davis, Commissioner Young promptly reported changes in 
the region.  Responding to a successful Bolshevik attack on Poland August 10, 1920 Young 
reported that the situation in the Baltic area was critical and warned that armed conflict will 
break out between Estonia and Soviet Russia because Estonia would reject its demand for a 
union.144  Unlike Ambassador Davis, he promptly warned the State Department of a hostile 
situation and received a reply from Secretary Colby the following day.  Young’s concern was 
matched by Major Edward W. Ryan, the American Red Cross Commissioner for the Baltic States 
and Western Russia.145  In response to their concern, on August 11th, the USS Pittsburgh was 
sent to Tallinn and plans were made to evacuate the 250 Americans involved in relief efforts in 
the Baltic States.146  Regardless of the situation, the presence of the visiting admirals and 
commanders from the U.S. likely sparked hope along with inquiry on the part of the nationalist 
Baltic governments.  Latvian President K. Ulmanis, like other Baltic leaders, wondered why U.S. 
ships were there because of their consistent refusal to recognize Baltic independence.147  
However, the important part is that U.S. ships were actually sent to the region, even though it 
was not to help fight the Russians (be they Bolsheviks or Imperialists), but rather because 
Young was actually concerned about the severity of the situation and reported it to his 
superiors.  His reports on desperate conditions in Latvia and Estonia caused the State Depart to 
“appraise the situation in the Baltic with caution…the Department felt that conditions in Latvia 
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were ‘more disturbed than usual.’”148  The reappraisal of the Baltic situation definitely did not 
favor recognition because it showed instability, but it served as a reminder that the Baltic 
region no longer considered itself and integral part of Russia.    
 In a letter from President Wilson to the President of the assembly of the League of 
Nations, Paul Hymans, Wilson stated a reason against recognition; he was concerned about the 
instability on Russia’s borders created by mutual mistrust and fear of war.149  The Soviets 
refused to demobilize because they were afraid of new attacks, while nationalist groups on 
Russia’s border are afraid to disarm because they did not trust the Bolsheviks.150  Wilson’s 
explanation of his concern gave hope to some Baltic nationalists.  The passage in question is 
written as follows:  
It is obvious to all that these small struggling border states will not attack Great Russia 
unless encouraged by promise of support from the stronger powers…an attempt at 
pacification must be a public and solemn engagement among the Great Powers not to 
take advantage of Russia’s stricken condition and not to violate the territorial integrity 
of Russia nor undertake themselves any further invasions of Russia, not to tolerate such 
invasions by others. . . . The responsibility for any new war which might break out on the 
Russian border would then be clearly placed.151  
Jonas Vileišis, the self-titled “Representative of Lithuania in America” (which is how he signed 
all of his communications with the State Department), saw the opportunity to change America’s 
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attitude.  Although the passage states that the U.S. does not want to “violate the territorial 
integrity of Russia,” ideals of pacification are mentioned, and if he could convince the State 
Department that Lithuania’s actions were rooted solely in self-defense and they had no further 
intention of engaging in conflict with Russia, perhaps America’s foreign policy would change.  
Unsuccessfully, Vileišis tried just that.  On January 27th, he assured the State Department that 
the Lithuanian government wanted to return to peaceful existence and their military efforts 
were only in self-defense against Bolshevik aggression.152  The new pleas for recognition tried 
to address Wilson’s concerns by explaining the regions violence employing self-defense and 
claiming a wish for peaceful relations with Russia.  Of course, that did not change the fact that 
American policy was still under the influence of the Russian Ambassador Bakhmetev and in the 
hands of officials that were devoted to the concept of a Great Russia. 
Chapter 5: Post Civil War Hurdles for U.S. Recognition 
External intervention from the U.S. primarily came in the form of political influence 
through self-determination rhetoric, siding with White Russians during the Civil War, and 
voiding the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that caused internal instability.  The limited extent of U.S. 
intervention in the Baltics kept pleas for recognition going.  The lack of independence 
recognition from the international community that allowed for the internal instability of the 
Baltics to get so out of control ended in relatively stable Baltic Republics run by indigenous local 
governments. The de jure recognition offered by the Supreme Allied Council, excluding the U.S., 
and American political changes in administration and diplomatic personality, allowed domestic 
pushes for recognition to prevail.     
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One must first understand why the United States was looking into the Baltic situation in 
order to comprehend how U.S. foreign policy changed with the onset of 1920.  In his 1919 
“Report of the Mission to Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania” commissioned by the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Robert Hale notes the importance of the Baltic States in the U.S.: 
The key to the Russian problem is in the Baltic States, and on the proper solution of the 
Russian problem depends the peace of the world.  We can not shirk these problems and 
do our duty as the world power which, whether we like it or not, we are… We can not 
ignore them… For the world’s sake and our own selfish sake, we can not afford to have 
Bolshevism coming through to the west; we can not afford to have an ambitious and 
unscrupulous Prussia piercing through to the east…The problem is as monumental as it 
is urgent.153 
Following Hale’s report, serious changes in U.S. foreign policy were primarily limited to Western 
Europe.  However, Hale represents the interest of small groups of government officials that felt 
it was a moral right for the U.S. government to address the Russian problem in terms of the 
Baltic States.  The fear of Bolshevik expansion accompanied the moral obligation the majority of 
Baltic independence supporters argued was the reason that the U.S. must extend recognition.  
Yet the initial de jure recognition attempts by such groups or individuals did not work. 
Attempts at de facto recognition were likewise unsuccessful.  The State Department and 
American officials abroad were careful to make sure that their correspondence with 
secessionist states was minimal and would not yield de facto recognition.  Feeling 
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unrepresented in the U.S., Baltic governments unsuccessfully tried to appoint Consuls in 
Washington.154 Indirect attempts at gaining international recognition of their sovereignty 
through de facto diplomatic relations were used by all Baltic governments after initial formal 
recognition attempts fell through but they had no official relations with the State 
Department.155  For example, the State Department did acknowledge the correspondence 
between the U.S. minister in Bern, Pleasant Stovall, and the Lithuanian National Council in 
Lausanne but did not consider those contacts as the formation of de facto relations.156  Acting 
carefully to not establish de facto relations, Lansing “took under serious scrutiny…Stovall’s 
request for transmission of Lithuanian communications from Lausanne to the American 
Lithuanian National Council in Washington.”157   
Baltic representatives were turned away from the United States, so as to not establish 
de facto relations.  As a first step toward attempted de facto recognition, the American 
Lithuanian National Council informed the State Department that Dr. John Szlupas has been 
“detailed to act as the envoy to the U.S.”158  Although there was no reply from the Americans 
and Dr. Szlupas was not accepted into the ranks of foreign diplomats.159  If the U.S. had 
accepted him as an envoy, diplomatic de facto relations could have been established; 
contradicting U.S.-Baltic policy.  A similar situation occurred with an Estonian representative.  
Ferdinand Kull was selected as the Estonian official to go to Washington to discuss matters of 
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mutual interest, and try to establish relations.  However, Minister Ira N. Morris cabled the State 
Department from Stockholm that Kull was pro-German, causing the acting Secretary of State, 
Richard L. Polk, to give instructions to deny Kull’s visa application.160  The rejection of Estonia’s 
attempt at de facto relations also showed the difficulty the U.S. government had in determining 
the intentions of Baltic officials.  Morris’ accusation of Kull’s pro-German leanings cast doubt on 
his sincerity and good faith, and was another legitimate excuse to reject recognition.   
The 1920 election brought along with it a change of administration, diplomatic staff, and 
a chance for foreign policy revision in favor of Baltic independence.  Domestic elections 
frequently influence that nation’s foreign relations, so the Baltic nationalists began to intervene 
in U.S. domestic elections for their own gain.  The significance of the 1920 election for 
supporters of Baltic independence is evidenced by domestic pressure placed upon the new 
President for recognition as unofficial Baltic representatives were setting up offices in 
Washington.  Before Harding was even inaugurated, he started to receive recognition petitions 
from American Lithuanians.161   
 A change in administration changed the officials that were in charge of formulating and 
carrying out U.S. foreign policy.  Warren G. Harding’s new Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, 
believed that, “independence and equality of states was the postulate of international 
relations.”162  This statement can either be taken cynically by comparing Hughes’ ideals to 
Wilson’s championing of self-determination that did not amount to much of anything for the 
Baltic States, or as an opportunity to change foreign policy.  Consul Albrecht, on the eve of 
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Harding’s inauguration, tried to push his support of the Baltics onto the newcomers in the State 
Department by reminding them that, “the United States remains the outstanding great power 
which has withheld not only de jure but de facto recognition… and failure to recognize will only 
cause ill-feeling and difficulty in trade relations.”163  He did not get a response, but this was the 
first attempt by an American diplomatic official to get Washington to change its policy of non-
recognition.   
 Colby and Hughes had more relaxed policies toward Baltic representatives on missions 
of a diplomatic nature than Lansing.  For example, under Colby and Hughes, Kalninš and Vileišis 
were able to stay in DC as the unofficial consular agent of Latvia, and Lithuania’s unofficial 
representative, respectively.164  With Colby’s permission, Edward Wirgo was also appointed as 
Estonia’s unofficial representative of in the United States.165  Those representatives were 
informal, but they were not sent away- making another stride toward recognition.   
The appointment of Consular representatives to the Baltic region was a huge stride 
toward recognition.  It gave the State Department a much closer look at the region and much 
more reliable information.  Now, Washington could get reports that it trusted from its officials 
and know which political factions were in charge and whether or not they were stable enough 
for the U.S. to extend recognition.  Initially, there were only Consular representatives in Estonia 
and Latvia, and the battle for a Lithuanian Consular was also fought by Young.166   In a memo to 
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the State Department, he listed two reasons for the importance of Consular representation in 
Lithuania; there were an increasing number of countries that had recognized an independent 
Lithuania and were establishing diplomatic relations, and the British were trying to gain an 
economic monopoly in the area.167   
 Young reminded Hughes that England already had an appointed Commissioner for 
Lithuania while the U.S. still had yet to recognize the country and did not have a Consul in 
Kaunas.168  Growth of business transactions after 1920 between the U.S. and the Baltic States 
required the appropriate diplomatic institutions to handle the growing volume of trade.  The 
large presence of American Lithuanians with economic ties to the newly independent state 
made a strong argument for a Consul in Kaunas to facilitate trade and handle business.169  
Consequently, Clement S. Edwards was sent to Kaunas July 13, 1921 but received the additional 
instructions to remember that, “the question of the recognition of an independent Lithuanian 
Government by the United States was not involved.”170  Although the Consular appointment 
specified non-recognition, its presence was a visual reminder of slowly growing ties with the 
Americans.  In this manner, the external presence showcased a stabilizing internal situation. 
The U.S. would not have set up a Consul if the region was still in a chaotic state that could pose 
a threat to its staff.   
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External recognition, emphasized by Young’s support of independent Baltic States, 
helped the recognition process along.  Young was supportive of the Baltic nationalists and used 
his post and influence to continuously press for recognition.  He sent reports to Washington 
whenever another state recognized the Baltic States.171  With some reservation for Lithuania 
due to its conflict with Poland, the principal Allied powers, except the U.S., recognized the Baltic 
States on January 1921.172  The Baltic States were no longer without any powerful friends, even 
though they still lacked America’s recognition.  Continuing his pro-recognition tendency, Young 
followed up the Allied powers extension of recognition with the following reminder to his 
government: 
If I may venture a suggestion as to what form our policy should take, if any change in our 
policy is or may be contemplated, it would be that we extend without further delay de 
jure recognition to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, coupled with a frank statement that we 
leave to the future the determination of the relationship which shall exist between the 
present so-called Baltic States and a new, orderly, and stable Russia.173 
The latter portion of Young’s message reflected his view that any new Russia would not include 
the Baltic coast.  In this manner, Young differed from his predecessors.  By stating that the 
future relationship between the Baltics and Russia should be left to them, Young moves away 
from the idea that a strong Russia must, or should, include the Baltics.   
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Some private firms along with newspapers began to lobby the State Department for 
recognition less than two weeks before the Supreme Council of Allies extended it to Estonia and 
Latvia, and decided to hold off recognizing Lithuania temporarily until it solved the conflict with 
Poland over Vilnius.  Just before the decision of the Allied powers to recognize the Baltic States, 
a Memorandum on Behalf of Lithuanian Independence was received by the Acting Secretary of 
State from the PR firm of McAdoo, Cotton &Franklin on January 15th, 1921.174  The memo listed 
the following arguments for recognition: 
1. The U.S. government is traditionally sympathetic to national aspirations. 
2. Hope for restoration of a free Russia should not stop the national aspirations of 
independent non-Russian peoples. 
3. Status quo would put non-Russian border peoples under unnecessary Russian 
misfortunes. 
4. Lithuanians are not Russians in every way; by race, language, religion, etc. 
5. The Lithuanian government has been recognized by Great Britain, France, Finland, 
Latvia, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Soviet Russia, and Italy while the U.S. unfairly 
recognized some former Russian territories, (i.e. Poland, Finland, and Armenia). 
6. Lithuania is throwing off Soviet rule, and should be encouraged and supported. 
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7. Recognition and admittance to the League of Nations would force Poland to withdraw 
its troops from Lithuania and deprive Soviet Russia of claim that Lithuania allows hostile 
troops on its territory, thus averting the danger of a Russian invasion.175 
McAdoo’s calls for recognition made it into the New York Times and spread those same ideas.  
The article states, “McAdoo says that the effect of refusal to recognize Lithuania is not to help 
the Russian people but to force the Lithuanians back into Russia under Soviet rule.”176  Claiming 
that the current policy would strengthen Soviet rule would likely gain Baltic recognition support 
from Americans that were previously indifferent or favored a democratic Russia with its old 
borders.  Although newspaper articles do not change foreign policy, they publicize actions of 
U.S. government officials that are subject to democratic elections.   
Congressman Chandler from New York was a major supporter of Baltic independence 
and lobbied the U.S. government for support and full recognition from within.  May 16, 1921 
the New York Representative argued that a nation requires four essential concurring elements 
to assert independence and claim the precious right of self-determination: physical basis of 
geography, territory, and population, well-defined distinctions in blood, language, and religion 
from the larger state, educational basis of citizenship, and governmental oppression by a larger 
nation over a small one.177  He argued in detail that each of the Baltic States has each of those 
elements and therefore a “sacred and solemn duty rests upon the United State to recognize at 
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once the independence de jure of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.”178  Further support came from 
Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, as he joined the petitioners.  Hoover spent time in 
Eastern Europe during his war-time relief experiences and supported recognition due to his 
concern for the suffering people and the opportunity present for expanding trade relations.179 
Memorial Day in 1921 saw the peak of a large campaign for recognition.  On that day, 
Harding received 135 volumes of bounded signed petitions from a delegation of American 
Lithuanians and Latvians introduced by Representative Chandler.180  One million signatures on a 
petition for recognition included Senators, Representatives, Governors, Professors, clergymen, 
mayors, and ordinary American citizens.181  Such massive petitions are difficult to ignore.  As 
the issue of Baltic recognition became more and more prevalent with stabilizing conditions in 
Eastern Europe, a change in policy once again seemed feasible.  Internal memorandums for and 
against recognition once again circulated in the State Department revamping the debate.182   
On September 22, 1921, the League of Nations voted the Baltic republics into full 
membership, affirming their nation-state status.  The Baltic republics were still looking for U.S. 
recognition.  Young summarized the Latvian (and by extension Estonian and Lithuanian) 
attitude toward the United States as: 
Hostility toward American policy; the keenest regret and disappointment at United 
States failure to extend de jure recognition; friendliness toward American citizens, due 
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to some extent to the activities of American relief organizations: the Red Cross, A.R.A., 
YMCA, YWCA, Joint Distribution Committee, and HIAS.183 
The question of Baltic recognition remained relatively quiet afterwards.  The only following 
progressive move on behalf of the U.S. in 1921 was the appointment of a Consul in Kaunas 
under Clements J. Edwards.   
Renewed debate among the State Department for Baltic independence recognition also 
brought with it a White Russian perspective.  July 1, 1921, Ambassador Bakhmetev submitted 
an Aide Memoire that said the problem of “the so-called Baltic States” was that they were 
temporary and did not have the deep-rooted historical traditions that would allow permanent 
severance from Russia.184  He claimed, “It would be a flagrant violation of the principle of 
political morality if advantage would be taken of the temporary disability of Russia for 
settlements which would prejudice Russia’s position as a political and economic entity.”185  This 
reminder of America’s duty to uphold Russia’s greatness and not recognize the Baltic States as 
independent entities took hold because recognition was once again delayed for another year.   
 1922 brought a change in U.S.-Baltic relations; by the end of Summer official relations 
were established.  In the beginning of the year, Washington was still clinging to its old policy 
and reiterated those views in the following statement: 
The United States has not recognized the so-called Governments of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania.  An American Commissioner and American consular officers are, nevertheless, 
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stationed within the territory which they control, and informal relations of a friendly 
character are maintained.  There are informal Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian 
representatives in the United States.186 
Although Washington claimed to maintain its earlier policy, the admission of having 
representatives, even of informal nature, differed significantly from previous statements.   
The removal of a strong Russian influence in the State Department paved the road to 
recognition.  Ambassador Bakhmetev resigned in April 28, 1922 from his influential post since 
his reception in Washington in July, 1917.187  Albert Tarulis sums up the Ambassador’s influence 
by stating, “Finally, a major obstacle toward recognition was eliminated with Bakhmetev’s 
resignation…Many a decision was first checked with him.  Many a communication carried ideas 
he had suggested.  Many a measure failed of adoption because he had disapproved.”188  
Following his resignation, supporters of Baltic independence had new opportunities to sway 
opinion in the State Department to their favor.   
After Bakhmetev’s resignation, the State Department tried to gain the most current 
information of the internal situation in the Baltics, suggesting an upcoming new policy.  Hughes 
took initiative by requesting the Division of Russian Affairs to prepare a memorandum listing all 
the pros and cons of recognition.189 The new Secretary of State no longer questioned 
recognition of Latvia and Estonia, but still wanted Young’s opinion as to whether the Vilna 
Plebiscite effectively ending the Polish-Lithuanian controversy justified simultaneous 
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recognition of Lithuania.190  Young replied that, “there is no longer any probability of armed 
conflict between Poland and Lithuania.”191  Along with opportunity for Baltic independence 
recognition, Young also received additional staff in preparation for such recognition.  The State 
Department assigned Consul Harold B. Quarton, Vice Consul Earl I. Packer, and additional 
personnel to Riga along with Young to make his office “the Department’s principal source of 
information relating to conditions and the progress of events in Soviet Russia”192  By assigning 
additional Americans to the region, the Baltics were becoming the West’s window to the East, 
and especially the happenings in Soviet Russia. 
The decision of the principal Allied powers to recognize the third Baltic State solidified 
the international community’s view, with the exception of the U.S., that the internal Baltic 
situation was stable.  Settlement of the Vilnius question allowed for de jure recognition of 
Lithuania to be extended by the principal Allied powers.193  The Associated Press wrote about 
the June 30, Conference of Ambassadors’ decision: 
No representative of the United States participated in this decision nor in the discussion 
which preceded the action of the Council.  Opinion was withheld on the part of the 
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United States and the right reserved for the American Government to take whatever 
attitude it cared to later.194 
Undoubtedly, the large number of Baltic Americans and other supporters of independence 
recognition were unhappy with such news.  Independent republics of Estonia and Latvia had 
already been recognized now that Lithuania agreed to stop fighting Poland for Vilnius and also 
gained recognition, U.S. policy seemed outdated and out of touch with the rest of the Western 
world.  Publicity of the continuing non-recognition policy reenergized domestic pressure.   
Commissioner Young confirmed that U.S. policy seemed outdated and should be 
reconsidered.  He submitted another request for the U.S. to extend recognition to the Baltic 
States April 6, 1922.  He affirmed: 
A careful and searching survey of conditions today unquestionably brings one to the 
conclusion that, given a continuation of conditions as they are at present, these States 
will encounter comparative little difficulty in maintaining themselves as political 
entities… each one of these so-called States has made very considerable and very 
substantial progress in the primary and essential work of the successful administration 
of their several territories…bear in mind the fact that in each one of these countries the 
nationals of the government in power make up the great majority of the 
population…these governments exercise their power by and with the consent of their 
respective peoples. 195 
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His appraisal of the Baltic situation affirms the maintenance of its newfound stability.   By 1922, 
the nationalists were in full control and Young describes their administration as “successful.”  
Young affirmed that all three States were ready for recognition since they were already 
functioning under the principles of self-determination.196  After a turbulent period, their 
governments were representative of their populations and they were ruling with consent, all 
principles U.S. rhetoric supported.   
Following the Council’s recognition of Lithuania, a petition of 29 prominent American 
educators asked for recognition of all three Baltic States.  Princeton University Professor Harold 
H. Bender led the petition.197  It that implored Hughes “in behalf of national justice, 
international peace and stability, and the growth of democratic ideals in the world that the 
Government of the United States extend formal recognition to the republics of Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Esthonia.”198  In his quest to gain support of other professors, Bender sent letters to 
his peers at other universities pointing out America’s outdated foreign policy.  Noting recent 
stabilizing events and the four years of maintained independence of those states, Bender claims 
the Baltic States “represent democracy as we understand it.”199  He writes that there is no real 
objection from the government and at the time, there was none, other than a continued policy 
from Lansing’s term.  Signed by esteemed American educators such as the President Emeritus 
of Harvard, Presidents of Princeton, Lafayette, and Mount Holyoke, the petition was brought to 
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Hughes’ personal attention.200  The petition seemed to work because within one month of its 
receipt, U.S. policy changed.    
The last domestic push for recognition made Hughes address President Harding in favor 
of revising U.S. policy.  On July 24, 1922, Hughes wrote a letter to Harding stating his belief that 
the time had come to grant recognition to “the so-called Baltic States.”201  He noted that the 
economic and political conditions under the Baltic governments have been stable within their 
jurisdictions, informal relations have been established between them and the U.S. for over two 
years, and have been recognized by all other important governments.202  Regarding Russia, 
Hughes wrote of the motive for a change in policy: 
Recognition by the United States has been delayed by considerations connected with 
the whole Russian problem…it was felt that the interest of the United States required 
for the future a strong and united as well as democratic Russia…we can, I believe, deal 
with the Baltic question on its merits, extend recognition to the Baltic Governments and 
have this action accord with our general Russian policy.203 
Hughes’ letter, like the one he received from Professor Bender five days earlier, summarizes the 
difficulty in gaining recognition because it was seen as an integral part of Russia but asserts that 
it should change.204  The belief in the right of the Baltic situation to be handled on its own 
mimics prior arguments based on self-determination.  Hughes’ description of Russia’s political 
situation as the “Russian problem” and the political situation in the Baltics as the “Baltic 
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question” separates the two areas.  The economic situation was reexamined and the debt of 
the Baltic governments was deemed to be in no different position to the U.S. as that of other 
Allied governments; thus favoring recognition as was noted on the State Department file.205  As 
for Harding, he was “quite agreeable to recognition and most cordially endorsed the form of 
announcement” suggested by Hughes.206   
Harding’s rapid approval of Hughes’ recommendation for extending recognition finalized 
the decision.  Young was instructed on July 25th to inform the Foreign Offices of each Baltic 
State that the U.S. would extend de jure recognition to all three of them on July 28th.207  Full 
recognition from the U.S. was granted July 28, 1922 with the following message: 
…the Government of the United States takes cognizance of the actual existence of these 
Governments during a considerable period of time and of the successful maintenance 
within their borders of political and economic stability.  The United States has 
consistently maintained that the disturbed conditions of Russian affairs may not be 
made the occasion for the alienation of Russian territory, and this principle is not 
deemed to be infringed by the recognition at this time of the Governments of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania which have been set up and maintained by an indigenous 
population.208 
With this statement, Baltic and Russian policy officially became two separate entities.  
Recognition was based on the maintenance of political stability and the principle of self-
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determination as shown by the description of Baltic governments as set up by “an indigenous 
population.”  The State Department’s Diplomatic List changed the status of unofficial Baltic 
representatives in Washington to Chargés d’Affaires with Louis Seja representing Latvia as of 
Sept 28 1922, Voldemaras čarneckis representing Lithuania as of October 11 1922, and Anthony 
Piip representing Estonia as of Dec 31 1923.209 
Conclusion 
In the course of five years, a little known area of Western Russia became three 
independent and fully recognized Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.  To the U.S. and 
other foreign powers, these states were previously unheard of and questions of independence 
and de jure recognition unimaginable.  Upon admission to the Russian Empire, they were 
known as the territories of Swedish Estonia, Swedish Livonia, and the Duchy of Courland and 
Semigallia.  
Thanks to the self-determination principles feeding off of initial nationalistic aspirations, 
Russia’s Baltic Provinces began pushing for independence.  External intervention in the form of 
World War I and the Russian Civil War wreaked havoc in a political, economic, and 
humanitarian sense.  The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Versailles Peace Treaty, and the Russian 
Civil War all created tremendous instability in the Baltic region by removing traces of Bolshevik, 
White Russian, and German power.  That same political instability allowed nationalist factions 
to take the opportunity to declare their independence and then fight for it while also stopping 
the United States from recognizing and supporting nationalistic ambitions.   
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Without the turbulent events leading up to the end of the Russian Civil War in the Baltic 
States, it is unlikely that nationalist groups would have been able to rise to power and form 
independent governmental institutions.  Power vacuums created by external intervention and 
fluctuating hands of power during the Great War and both Russian Revolutions gave rise to 
indigenous democratic governments by the time the Civil War ensued the region.  During the 
Civil War, the local governments were threatened by both White and Red Russian factions but 
made their peace with the side that seemed to be winning, the Bolsheviks.  Ultimately, 
nationalist governments did establish themselves as legitimate powers in the Baltic States and 
were able to transform their newfound situation enough to gain U.S. recognition.   
The process of regional stabilization was reflected in the fight for U.S. recognition.  
Domestic groups, private firms, and some U.S. government officials joined the Baltic States in 
lobbying the State Department for assistance, whether it be military or political, in solidifying 
the independence of the Baltic States.  As time passed without any further external 
interventions, Baltic governments were stable enough to overcome the last hurdles of U.S. non-
recognition policy due to the changing political landscape of America.  By June of 1922, 
Ambassador Bakhmetev had resigned, Secretary Lansing and President Wilson were out of 
office, WWI definitively ended, the Russian Civil War was dwindling in favor of the Bolsheviks, 
armed conflict in the Baltics died down after the 1920 Baltic-Soviet peace treaties, and the 
international community had already extended either de jure or de facto recognition.  Internal 
stability in the hands of indigenous Baltic governments had formed out of the chaotic 
conditions brought on by external intervention.  That stability was confirmed by the last 
influential Western power to extend de jure recognition on July 28, 1922.  Although the Baltic 
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States would once again become a part of Russia under the USSR, the interim period between 
the two world wars did exist with independent Baltic governments.  Memories and stories of 
independence from a prior generation played a key role in the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
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